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V. Clemency
On January 14, 1994, Earl Washington, Jr., accepted a conditional
pardon from Virginia Governor L. Douglas Wilder, commuting his sen-




All attorneys should be aware that a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is not a personal attack. Even the most experienced attorney
28 Peter Baker, Death-Row Inmate Gets Clemency: Agreement Ends
Day of Suspense, The Washington Post, Jan. 15, 1994, at Al.
29 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) (holding that the right to
appointment of a mental health expert attaches once an indigent defen-
dant shows that sanity will be a significant factor in his defense; lower
courts have expanded this right to include more than mental health
experts). See case summary of Spencer v. Murray (Spencer II), Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
30 For example, at Washington's penalty trial, the defense called an
expert for the purpose of showing defendant's low level of intellectual
can overlook or not understand forensic evidence, but every attorney can
independently seek help or can make an Ake 29 motion for appointment of
an expert to help in understanding the significance of forensic reports.
Likewise, attorneys should educate themselves about mental retar-
dation. It is not the same thing as insanity, 30 and a qualified evaluation of
a defendant's level of mental retardation is a necessity.
3 1
Summary and analysis by:
Barbra Anna Pohl
functioning. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth's attorney was
permitted, over objection, to testify that Washington knew the difference
between right and wrong. This, obviously, is a question relevant to the
complete defense of insanity, rather than the mitigating sentencing factor
of mental retardation. The colloquy suggests, however, that the prosecu-
tor and court may not have understood the distinction. Washington v.
Commonwealth, 228 Va. at 546, 323 S.E.2d at 585.
31 See Silvia Linda Simpson, Confessions and tile Mentally
Retarded Capital Defendent: Cheating to Lose, Capital Defense Digest,
this issue.
SMITH v. DIXON
14 F.3d 956 (4th Cir. 1994)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
A jury sentenced Kermit Smith, Jr. to death following his conviction
of the December 3, 1980, first-degree murder, second-degree rape, and
common-law robbery of Whelette Collins. After the jury convicted
Smith, the trial court held a sentencing hearing in which it submitted four
aggravating circumstances and five mitigating circumstances for consid-
eration by the jury. The jury found the aggravating circumstances in sup-
port of the imposition of the death penalty on all four bases submitted. 1
On appeal of his conviction and sentence Smith did not challenge the
constitutionality of the "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel" aggravat-
ing factor. The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed Smith's con-
viction and sentence,2 and when the United States Supreme Court denied
his request for certiorari, 3 his conviction became final on November 29,
1982.
1 The four aggravating circumstances found were that the murder
was committed while (1) raping, (2) robbing, and (3) kidnapping Collins,
and (4) that the murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."
Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 670 (4th Cir. 1993). See case summary of
Smith, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 1, p. 18 (1993) [hereinafter
Smith 1].
2 State v. Smith, 292 S.E.2d 264 (N.C. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1056 (1982).
3 Smith v. North Carolina, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982).
4 Smith's Motion for Appropriate Relief raised fifty-seven issues
grouped into five "Claims", with his challenge to the "heinous, atrocious
or cruel" factor being Claim No. IV and his ineffective assistance of
counsel claim being Claim No. V.
5 The order stated:
In June 1983, Smith filed his first application for post-conviction
relief with the superior court and raised for the first time the argument
that the "especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel" statutory aggravating
factor was unconstitutionally vague, in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Smith also claimed that the jury was not
charged on a constitutionally limiting definition of this factor and that his
attorneys rendered ineffective assistance of counsel during his trial and
appeal.4 Without conducting a hearing or requesting a response from the
State, the superior court entered an order denying Smith's request for
relief.5 Subsequent petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina 6 and the United States Supreme Court7 were summarily denied.
Smith's second motion for relief was filed in superior court in North
Carolina and was again denied.8 Both the Supreme Court of North
This matter was heard on a paperwriting entitled "Motion for
Appropriate Relief' filed June 6, 1983 by [Smith's attorneys].
The court has read the paperwriting and considered the
arguments in support of the claims set out therein. The court
finds as a fact that the Claims No. I, II, I, and IV, set forth no
probable grounds for relief.
It is concluded that the matters alleged in Claim[] No. V
constitute a sufficient showing to require a plenary hearing ....
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED THAT:
1. Claims No. 1, 11, 111, and IV are denied.
2. A plenary hearing in Claim[] No. V is to be held.
6 State v. Smith, 333 S.E.2d 495 (N.C. 1985).
7 Smith v. North Carolina, 474 U.S. 1026 (1985).
8 State v. Smith, Nos. 80 CRS 15265, 15266, 15271 (N.C. Super. Ct.
Mar. 9, 1987).
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Carolina 9 and the United States Supreme Court 10 subsequently denied
certiorari.
Smith petitioned the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina for habeas relief in May of 1988. The district
court rejected the State's contentions that Smith was barred from pursu-
ing claims other than his ineffective assistance of counsel claims and
those raised by him on direct appeal. 11 The district court held that Smith
could pursue those issues raised for the first time in his motion for appro-
priate relief because the superior court, in denying relief, had not stated
"clearly and expressly" that it based its decision "on a state procedural
bar."
12
On the merits, the district court concluded that Smith's sentencing
jury had been instructed to weigh an unconstitutionally vague aggravat-
ing factor during the penalty phase of his trial. 13 It further held that the
Supreme Court of North Carolina had not cured this error by reweighing
the evidence or conducting a constitutional harmless error analysis.
14
The district court then determined that, as a federal court, it lacked the
authority to review for harmless error. 15 Consequently, it concluded that
the writ must issue unless the Supreme Court of North Carolina proceed-
ed to cure the error. 16 The Supreme Court of North Carolina subse-
quently denied the State's request for clarification of its earlier opinion
that had rejected the issues raised in Smith's direct appeal, stating that it
lacked the jurisdiction to do so. 17 The district court then ordered its deci-
sion into effect, granting Smith a new sentencing hearing.
18
Both Smith and the State appealed, with Smith arguing that the dis-
trict court erred in failing to find that the additional grounds he had
advanced also provided a basis for relief. A panel of the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the district court in all respects, holding that because the superi-
or court decision did not include an adequate statement that its decision
rested on a state procedural bar,19 and because nothing in the surround-
ing circumstances indicated that the superior court rested its decision on
such a bar,20 the district court had correctly determined that Smith was
not procedurally barred from federal habeas review of his claim chal-
lenging the limiting construction of the "heinousness" factor. On the mer-
its, the State conceded that the construction was insufficient.
Additionally, the court held that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
9 State v. Smith, 364 S.E.2d 668 (N.C. 1988).
10 Smith v. North Carolina, 485 U.S. 1030 (1988).
11 Smith v. Dixon, 766 F. Supp. 1370, 1376-77 (E.D.N.C. 1991). If
the State's position had been sustained, Smith's "heinous, atrocious or
cruel" claim would have been barred.
12 Id. at 1376 (quoting Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 263 (1989)).
13 Smith, 766 F. Supp. at 1383. See also Falkner, The Constitutional
Deficiencies of Virginia's "Vileness" Aggravating Factor, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 2, No. 1, p. 19 (1989).
14 Smith, 766 F. Supp. at 1386. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738 (1990) (holding that the United States Constitution does not pre-
vent a state appellate court from upholding a death sentence that is based
in part on an invalid or improperly applied aggravating circumstance, as
long as the appellate court either reweighs the aggravating and mitigating
evidence or conducts harmless error review). See also case summary of
Clemons, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 8 (1990).
15 Smith, 766 F. Supp. at 1386.
16 Id. at 1386, 1396.
17 State v. Smith, 412 S.E.2d 68 (N.C. 1991). See also Clemons, 494
U.S. at 754, which held that state appellate courts are not required to
engage in reweighing or harmless error analysis when errors have
occurred in a capital sentencing proceeding, and that in some instances a
state appellate court may conclude that peculiarities in a case make appel-
late reweighing or harmless error analysis extremely speculative or
impossible. Nevertheless, that decision is for state appellate courts to
make.
had not cured the vagueness error,2 1 and that only the Supreme Court of
North Carolina could cure the error in the first instance. 22 Thereafter, the
Fourth Circuit granted the State's motion for en bane consideration.
HOLDING
The full Court of Appeals reversed the panel decision and reinstated
Smith's sentence, holding that because the summary order denying relief
on Claims I through IV of Smith's motion did not fairly appear to rest pri-
marily on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law, but rather,
fairly appeared to rest on an independent state procedural bar,23 Smith
had procedurally defaulted those issues raised for the first time in Claims
I through IV.24 The court also held that federal courts considering a fed-
eral habeas petition may properly conduct reweighing and harmless error
review of trial errors, including the error occasioned by an unconstitu-
tionally vague instruction on an aggravating sentencing factor.25 Finally,
Smith's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were not barred, but




The decision of the Fourth Circuit illustrates some of the hazards
inherent in federal habeas review. Here, Smith should have raised his
vagueness challenge to the "heinousness" factor at trial and on direct
appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, thereby avoiding the pitfall
of procedural default.
In Michigan v. Long27 the Supreme Court established a presumption
of federal jurisdiction on direct review for cases where "the adequacy and
independence of any possible state law ground is not clear."28 This pre-
sumption meant that jurisdiction existed if adequate and independent
state grounds for a decision were not apparent. In Harris v. Reed2 9 this
presumption was extended to federal habeas review where the Court held
that federal habeas review is not barred unless the state court issues a
"plain statement" that its judgment rests on a state procedural bar.30
18 Smith v. Dixon, No. 88-337 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 1991).
19 Smith v. Dixon, 996 F.2d 667, 674 (4th Cir. 1993).
20 Id. at 675.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 676.
23 Smith v. Dixon, 14 F.3d 956, 963 (4th Cir. 1994) [hereinafter
Smith II].
24 Id. at 973.
25 Id. at 974.
26 Id. at 982.
27 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
28 Id. at 1040-41.
29 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
30 Id. at 263. Long dealt with the question of federal jurisdiction and
held that federal courts have no jurisdiction if the issue was decided on
adequate and independent state law grounds. For example, a federal court
would not have jurisdiction if an issue was decided. on Fourth
Amendment grounds under the Virginia Constitution, as opposed to the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Federal courts in
habeas proceedings, however, have jurisdiction over defaulted claims if
the state law ground is a state procedure, such as failure to follow a state
requirement that the issue be raised at trial and on direct appeal. For rea-
sons of comity and federalism, however, federal courts generally decline
to hear such claims. Counsel should note that it is usually state default
rules or filing deadlines that are asserted as "adequate and independent
state law grounds" in capital habeas litigation.
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The reasoning of Long and Harris was undermined in Coleman v.
Thompson,3 1 where it was held that a predicate to the application of the
Harris presumption in favor of allowing federal habeas review is that the
last state court rendering a judgment on defendant's federal claims must
fairly appear to rest its rejection of the claims primarily on federal law or
be interwoven with federal law.32 Thus, after Coleman the test for denial
of federal habeas review was no longer simply the presence of a "plain
statement" of procedural bar, and the importance of federalizing and pre-
serving issues at the pre-trial and trial stages was further heightened.
The Smith court, focusing on the limiting nature of Coleman, stated
that "the failure of the superior court order to mention federal law must
be the focus of our inquiry", 3 3 and such failure was "extremely signifi-
cant" and "compelling evidence" that the summary order did not fairly
appear to rest on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law.34 The
court also found that the circumstances surrounding entry of the summa-
ry order by the superior court indicated reliance by the superior court on
a state procedural bar as the basis for its decision.
35
The predicament permitted by Coleman and Smith can best be
avoided by the Virginia capital defense attorney by simply not defaulting.
Additionally, at pre-trial, a Bill of Particulars requesting a narrowing con-
struction should be filed. Defending a Capital Murder Case in Virginia,
published by the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse, contains many of
the appropriate motions and supporting memoranda that can and should
be filed at this crucial pre-trial stage in order to preserve claims for fed-
eral review.
Counsel should also object at trial when the jury is instructed on the
vileness factor. If a death sentence is handed down based on "vileness",
defense counsel should assign it as error on appeal and brief it before the
Supreme Court of Virginia.
36
Once the Supreme Court of Virginia rejects the appeal on the mer-
its, however, counsel is not encouraged to include the claim in a state
habeas petition. Instead, the claim is at that point exhausted and ready to
present in federal habeas. The acceptability of this strategy, where a
claim has been preserved on federal grounds and rejected on direct
appeal, was clarified by the recent decision in Spencer v. Murray,
37
31 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991) (holding that an appeal one day late from
denial of state habeas corpus bars review of the merits of habeas claim).
32 Coleman, 11l S. Ct. at 2557.
33 Smith HI, 14 F.3d at 964.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 965. In reaching this determination it should be noted that
the majority delved deeply into the intent of North Carolina law to con-
clude that default was the basis of the cursory denial order (see note 6,
supra), even though, unlike in Coleman, the state did not urge default and
in fact was not even called upon to respond.
36 All of these steps are necessary to avoid default. See Lago,
Litigating the "Vileness" Factor, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1,
p. 25 (1991).
37 5 F.3d 758, 761 (1993). See case summary of Spencer I, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue.
38 This position is consistent with that taken by the Attorney General
in Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271 (1970), where the
Commonwealth argued that Va. Code Ann. § 8-605 modifies the com-
mon law rule that resjudicata does not apply to habeas corpus proceed-
ings and that the statute should be construed to prohibit frivolous use of
habeas corpus petitions. This denies indigent petitioners the right to liti-
gate endlessly, at state expense, issues which have previously been
resolved. See also Grundler v. North Carolina, 283 F.2d 798 (4th Cir.
1960) (holding that if a question is presented and adjudicated by a state's
highest court once, it is not necessary for a state prisoner seeking federal
relief to urge it upon the court a second time under an alternate procedure
before he can be deemed to have exhausted his state remedies).
where the court held that once a claim raised on direct appeal before the
Supreme Court of Virginia has been rejected on the merits, counsel may
forego state habeas as to that claim, as state remedies have been exhaust-
ed.3
8
II. Harmless Error Review by Federal Habeas Courts
The court offered four justifications for its conclusion that federal
habeas courts have the authority to review the error in application of the
"heinousness" factor for harmlessness. First, the court stated that the
Supreme Court has specifically approved of federal courts conducting
harmless error analysis on habeas review, even in capital sentencing.
39
Second, the Supreme Court has always analyzed the propriety of apply-
ing harmless error analysis based on the type of error at issue, not on the
particular court conducting the analysis.4 0 Third, in characterizing the
error presented in Smith's "heinousness" claim as the type that may be
assessed for harmlessness, the United States Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that this type of error is a "trial error." 41 Fourth, the court stated
that it must be authorized and qualified to assess the prejudicial impact of
an unconstitutionally vague instruction on an aggravating factor since it
was already required to conduct the same type of evaluation in determin-
ing prejudice in ineffective assistance of counsel claims under Strickland
v. Washington,4 2 and in deciding whether to excuse Smith's procedural
default of his "heinousness" claims, as set out in Wainwright v. Sykes.
43
The Fourth Circuit also stated that concerns of "comity and federalism"
weighed in favor of concluding that federal courts on habeas review are
authorized to conduct harmless error analysis for the type of error at issue
in Smith.44
The reasoning of the court here seems to be at odds with Stringer v.
Black,4 5 a case where the Court stated that "[i]t will be a strange rule of
federalism that ignores the view of the highest court of a state as to the
meaning of its own laws",4 6 thereby recognizing the necessity of allow-
ing state courts to develop state law. Similarly, in Richmond v. Lewis47
the Court held that "where the death sentence has been infected by a
vague or otherwise constitutionally invalid aggravating factor, the state
39 Smith H, 14 F.3d at 976.
40 Id.
41 Id. (citing Clemons, 494 U.S. at 738, 752).
42 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Strickland created a two prong test for
determining whether counsel's performance was so defective as to deny
defendant his constitutional right to counsel. First, the defendant must
prove that counsel's performance was incompetent. Incompetency is to
be judged by an "objective standard of reasonableness." Second, the
defendant must prove that counsel's deficiencies prejudiced him in that
the "errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial...
whose result is reliable." The standard for the element of prejudice is
whether "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unpro-
fessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
In this context, "reasonable probability" is defined as "a probability suf-
ficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."
Defense counsel should be aware, however, that an arguably more
rigorous standard than that required by Strickland is applied against cap-
ital defendants in the Fourth Circuit. See case summary of Washington v.
Murray, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
43 433 U.S. 72, 87 (1977) (holding that if cause and prejudice are
shown, a court may accept a federal habeas petition despite the presence
of a state procedural bar).
44 1d.
45 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992). See case summary of Stringer, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 11 (1992).
46 Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1139.
47 113 S. Ct. 528 (1992). See case summary of Richmond, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, p. 10 (1992).
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appellate court or some other state sentencer must actually perform a new
sentencing calculus, if the sentence is to stand.' 48 As Senior Circuit
Judge Sprouse stated in the Smith dissent, no amount of grammatical
parsing could alter "the clear instruction that the required harmless error
analysis must be conducted in the state judicial system." 49 The majority
disagreed and used language from Stringer to support its analysis.
Stringer stated that "the use of a vague . . . aggravating factor in the
weighing process invalidates the sentence and... requires constitutional
harmless-error analysis or reweighing in the state judicial system" if the
sentence is to stand.50 The majority reasoned that "the better reading of
[Stringer] is that 'in the state judicial system' modifies only 'reweigh-
ing'-just as 'constitutional' modifies only 'harmless-error analysis."' 5 1
The holding of the court also implicates Chapman v. California
52
and Brecht v. Abrahamson,53 two cases that addressed the appropriate
scope of review to be utilized on harmless error review. In Chapman, the
Court stated that before a federal constitutional error could be held harm-
less on direct appeal, the court would have to find that the error was harm-
less beyond a reasonable doubt, with the state bearing the burden of prov-
ing that an error passed muster under this standard. 54 The Brecht court,
citing the state's interest in finality of convictions, chose not to apply the
Chapman standard to federal habeas review and held that trial-type con-
stitutional errors are subject to a lower standard of harmless-error analy-
sis on federal habeas review ("actual prejudice") than on direct state
appeal ("harmless beyond a reasonable doubt").55 This situation, known
as the "Brecht anomaly," means the State faces an easier challenge on
habeas review than on direct state review. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina, assessing the unconstitutionally applied "heinous, atrocious or
cruel" factor would have been bound to use the Chapman formula. The
Smith panel had noted that "[the Supreme Court] intended not to apply the
Brecht anomaly in cases tainted by invalid aggravating factors." 56 This
view was rejected by the entire Fourth Circuit.
The Fourth Circuit's claim of authority to intrude into a state's cap-
ital scheme by conducting harmless error review is notable for its depar-
ture from precedent and should not be accepted. Rather, defense counsel
should object to it in hope of obtaining review by the United States
Supreme Court.
48 Richmond, 113 S. Ct. at 535 (emphasis added).
49 Smith II, 14 F.3d at 992-93 (Sprouse, J. dissenting).
50 Id. at 977 (quoting Stringer, 112 S. Ct. at 1140).
51 Id.
52 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
53 113 S. Ct. 1710 (1993).
54 Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
55 Brecht, 113 S. Ct. at 1719-20. Also, on habeas the defendant
bears the burden of establishing the impact of the error.
56 Smith I, 996 F.2d at 677 n.13.
57 Smith's other claims were that his Sixth Amendment right to
cross-examination was violated at trial and that the trial court violated
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985), when it referred to
the jury's decision on whether to impose the death penalty as a "recom-
mendation." In Caldwell, the Court held that "it is constitutionally imper-
missible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer
who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere."
58 Smith II, 14 F.3d at 982. Further, the majority held that "assum-
ing Smith could show that his counsel's actions were unconstitutionally
defective, he nevertheless has utterly failed to demonstrate that he was
prejudiced as a result."
M. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Smith contended that his appellate counsel was ineffective by failing
to raise three significant claims on direct appeal.57 As the subsequent his-
tory of the case reveals, the strongest of these was Smith's claim that the
"heinous, atrocious or cruel" statutory aggravating factor was unconstitu-
tionally vague in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Smith's position was that his attorney's default of this error, which was
later conceded by the State, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The court declined to hold even that the default violated the "per-
formance" prong of Strickland.58 The court reached this decision based
on the fact that "Smith's appellate counsel diligently researched the law
and chose to present those grounds on which he believed Smith had the
best chance of prevailing."
59
The notion that counsel in a capital case can choose to "default"
issues by winnowing out the weaker claims was approved in Smith v.
Murray,60 where it was described by the Court as the "hallmark of effec-
tive appellate advocacy." 6 1 Such "effective appellate advocacy" played
a part in the eventual execution of Michael Smith62 and may play a sim-
ilar role in the future of Kermit Smith. "Winnowing" of claims has no
proper place in capital appellate advocacy.
Counsel should be aware that it is not possible to determine what
claims will be recognized as meritorious during the often lengthy pen-
dency of the capital appellate process. The case of Jonathan Dale
Simmons is illustrative of this point.6 3 On appeal of his conviction for
murder, Simmons argued that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment
rights were violated when the trial judge refused defendant's requested
jury instruction that if sentenced to life imprisonment he would be ineli-
gible for parole.
64
Simmons's petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court
was granted,65 and now the Court will consider whether courts must
allow juries to be provided with accurate parole law information, both as
rebuttal to the state's case for death based on future dangerousness and as
mitigation evidence.
This claim, as briefed by the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse,
has been summarily rejected in many Virginia cases, as the Supreme
Court of Virginia has consistently prohibited jury instruction and argu-
ment on parole eligibility. 66 Simmons's case is proof, however, that per-
5 9 Id. at 973.
60 477 U.S. 527, 536 (1986).
61 Id.
62 In his state habeas petition Smith argued for the first time that the
admission of testimony by his mental health professional concerning the
content of an interview conducted to explore the possibility of presenting
psychiatric defenses at trial violated Smith's privilege against self-
incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution. Smith's appointed counsel, however, had failed to
raise this claim on direct appeal because he did not believe that Virginia
case law would have supported his position at that time. The United
States Supreme Court, characterizing defense counsel's choice as a
"deliberate, tactical decision", went on to hold that Smith had defaulted
his constitutional claim. 477 U.S. at 534. It should also be noted that no
justice disputed that Smith's claim had merit, even though the Supreme
Court of Virginia had rejected it.
63 State v. Simmons, 427 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1993).
64 Id. at 178.
65 114 S. Ct. 57 (1993).
66 See Straube, The Capital Defendant and Parole Eligibility,
Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 45 (1992).
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sistent advocacy in the face of judicial resistance can produce unexpect-
ed rewards, and the Virginia capital defense bar should take note that
whether such claims are preserved or defaulted can often be a matter of
life or death for many capital defendants.




5 F.3d 758 (4th Cir. 1993)
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
FACTS
Late in the evening on September 18 or early in the morning on
September 19, 1987, Timothy Wilson Spencer went to the home of
Debbie Dudley Davis. Spencer bound Davis's hands with shoestrings,
raped her and then strangled her to death with a "ligature and ratchet-
type" device, which he made out of a sock and vacuum cleaner hose.
Upon discovering the body, investigators found two hairs in the vic-
tim's pubic hair and determined that they were "consistent with"
Spencer's underarm hair. Investigators also found semen stains on the
victim's bedclothes. The presence of spermatozoa was further found
when vaginal and rectal swabs of the victim were taken. Forensic analy-
sis of the semen stains determined that the stains had been deposited by a
secretor whose blood characteristics matched those of only thirteen per-
cent of the North American population. Spencer's blood and saliva sam-
ples indicate that he is a member of that population group.
A semen sample from the victim's bedclothes and a sample of
Spencer's blood were subjected to DNA analysis. The analysis was per-
formed by Lifecodes, a private laboratory, which found that the DNA
molecules extracted from the semen stains matched the DNA molecules
extracted from Spencer's blood. Evidence presented at trial established
that the statistical likelihood of finding a duplication of Spencer's partic-
ular DNA pattern in the population of African Americans who live in
North America is only one in seven hundred five million. Further, the evi-
dence established that Spencer is one of only ten million black males liv-
ing in North America.
On September 22, 1988, a Richmond jury unanimously found
Spencer guilty of rape, burglary and capital murder, and sentenced him to
death. The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the death sentence on
direct appeal. 1 Spencer next filed a petition for habeas corpus with the
state trial court, which was dismissed. The Supreme Court of Virginia
refused to grant his petition for appeal when Spencer failed by one day to
meet the time limit established by Rule 5:17(a)(1) of the Rules of the
1 Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 295, 384 S.E.2d 785 (1989).
2 Rule 5:17(a)(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia
states:
Time for Filing. In every case in which the appellate jurisdic-
tion of this Court is invoked, a petition for appeal must be
filed with the Clerk of this Court:
(1) in the case of an appeal direct from a trial court, not more
than three months after entry of the order appealed from ....
Supreme Court of Virginia.2 Spencer filed a motion to extend the time for
filing that petition for appeal, but the Supreme Court of Virginia denied
the motion. Spencer next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus with
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The
district court denied his petition on the ground that Spencer had failed to
exhaust all available state remedies.
3
Next, Spencer filed an appeal with the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Spencer based his appeal on the follow-
ing five grounds: (1) DNA evidence in this case is unreliable; (2) defense
counsel was denied an opportunity to adequately defend against the DNA
evidence because the trial court denied a discovery request for Lifecodes'
worknotes and memoranda, the trial court refused to provide funds for an
expert defense witness, and the prosecution did not reveal evidence of
problems with Lifecodes' testing methods; (3) the trial court should not
have admitted the DNA evidence; (4) the prosecution improperly struck
Miss Chrita Shelton from the jury for racially-motivated reasons as pro-
hibited by Batson v. Kentucky;4 and (5) the future dangerousness aggra-
vating factor in Virginia's capital sentencing scheme is unconstitutional-
ly vague.
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that
many of Spencer's issues and claims were precluded from federal habeas
review because they were procedurally defaulted.
First, two claims were precluded because Spencer filed the state
habeas petition with the Supreme Court of Virginia one day past the
mandatory filing deadline set forth in Supreme Court of Virginia Rule
5:17(a)(1). 5 Those two claims alleged the unreliability of the DNA evi-
dence and that the defense could not adequately prepare because the trial
court did not provide a defense expert.
3 Spencer v. Murray, No. 3:91CV00391 (E.D. Va. April 30, 1992).
The petition was dismissed on the grounds that missing a filing deadline
does not count towards the exhaustion of state remedies, despite the fact
that the missed deadline renders it impossible for a defendant to further
avail himself of state remedies. As noted infra, failure to exhaust that is
occasioned by failure to follow state procedural rules is also procedural
default, which can bar consideration of the claims in federal court.
4 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
5 Spencer v. Murray, No. 910055 (Va. March 18, 1991) (two docu-
ments).
